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Through actions like product boycotts or imposing international labour standards, governments 
and consumer groups in rich countries put pressure on poor countries to discourage the use of 
child labour. But the child-labour problem in developing countries shows no sign of abating. Our 
research suggests that international activism may be partially to blame, because it can thwart 
regulation of child labour within developing countries. 
Ever since children toiled in the mines and factories of Britain during the Industrial Revolution, 
industrialization and economic development have stirred humanitarian concern about child 
labour. The first child-labour regulations (the British Factory Acts of the early 1800s) were 
aimed at the appalling working conditions children suffered in textile mills. Another source of 
social concern was the conflict between child labour and education opportunities. The 
campaign against child labour gained steam throughout the nineteenth century, and by the 
early twentieth century strict child-labour and compulsory education laws were in place in most 
industrialized countries.  
In the days of the Industrial Revolution, the regulation of child labour was strictly a domestic 
affair. By contrast, today child labour has become an international issue. For example, the 
working conditions of children in developing countries are a main focus of student activism in 
the United States, where “anti-sweatshop” campaigns are directed at multinational companies 
accused of exploiting children. Consumer activists also run fair-trade programs and labeling 
schemes for goods produced without the use of child labour. At the political level, international 
labour standards are currently a major point of contention in trade negotiations, with rich 
countries demanding that poor countries restrict the use of child labour. 
Given the rising international pressure, one might think that developing countries should have 
an incentive to eliminate child labour in haste. The data show, however, that child labour is still 
used widely throughout the developing world.i
Trade Sanctions and Poverty 
 In fact, in many countries child-labour rates are 
higher than they were in Britain and other industrializing European countries at the same stage 
of development. The apparent failure of international activism to curtail child labour raises the 
question of whether external pressure may be counterproductive. 
Indeed, a number of economists have voiced concern about the impact of international policy 
interventions on poor families that are affected by child labour. They argue that measures such 
as consumer boycotts or the enforcement of labour standards via trade sanctions reduce the 
export earnings of developing countries, and in turn, the incomes of families where either 
adults or children work in the export industry.  
This point is important because one root cause of child labour is poverty: families with working 
children tend to be poor, and often send some children to work in order to afford schooling for 
at least one or two of their children. If their income falls because of trade sanctions, these 
families may be forced to rely even more on child labour to make ends meet. So even if 
international action succeeds in moving children out of export industries, more children may 
end up working.ii
Trade Sanctions and Domestic Political Reform 
 
Despite the connection between poverty and child labour, international measures could still 
work in the long term if they triggered political changes. The examples of Britain and other 
industrializing European nations in the nineteenth century show that the ultimate solution to 
the child-labour problem lies in domestic political action. These countries eradicated child 
labour by imposing and strictly enforcing policies such as minimum-age laws for employment 
and compulsory schooling. The key question therefore is this: does international pressure on 
developing countries through trade sanctions or consumer boycotts make it more, or less, likely 
that these countries adopt comprehensive child-labour regulations on their own? 
At first sight, it may appear that external pressure can nudge developing countries towards  
erasing child labour entirely. After all, trade sanctions and consumer boycotts reduce the 
earning opportunities of working children, making child labour a lesser income source for 
families. In this way, these policies might weaken domestic opposition to a complete ban on 
child labour or strictly enforced compulsory schooling.  
In recent research (Doepke and Zilibotti 2009), we show that this intuition, however plausible, 
is likely to be wrong. To the contrary, we find that external pressure tends to lower domestic 
support for child-labour regulation, and may contribute to the persistence of the child labour 
problem in developing countries. 
Who Gains from Child-Labour Regulation? 
To assess how external pressure affects the likelihood of political reform, we need to know how 
laws such as minimum-age rules for working children and compulsory schooling came to be 
passed in the first place. In earlier work (Doepke and Zilibotti 2005), we looked at the history of 
child labour regulation in England and other industrializing countries in the nineteenth century.  
 The most important group pressuring for reform in these countries were labour unions 
representing unskilled workers. These workers were competing with children in the labour 
market, and could expect their own wages to rise if child labour were outlawed and 
competition for jobs reduced. Pressure groups with a humanitarian motivation also had some 
role to play, but unions were crucial to the reform—particularly in the late nineteenth century, 
when child-labour regulation became universal and compulsory schooling was introduced. 
Applying these findings to international interventions, we need to determine whether poor, 
unskilled workers in developing countries turn more or less in favor of a child-labour ban once 
sanctions or boycotts are in place. 
Displacing Children into Informal Employment Reduces Pressure for Reform 
In our analysis, we find that international interventions weaken domestic support for child-
labour restrictions because they reduce competition of children and unskilled adult workers in 
the labour market. Unskilled workers then have less incentive to push for child-labour 
regulation.  
When effective, trade sanctions or consumer boycotts move child workers from formal 
employment in the export sector to informal production, often in family-based agriculture. In 
the export sector, and particularly in factories, children and adults perform similar tasks and 
therefore compete directly for jobs. In the informal sector, children and adults usually have 
different work responsibilities.  
For example, on family farms children often specialize in tasks such as tending small animals, 
allowing adults to work in areas where they are most productive. Once adult and child labour 
become complementary in this way, restrictions on child labour no longer raise adult wages, 
which removes unskilled workers’ (and their unions’) incentives for supporting child-labour 
regulation. 
The effects of international interventions on developing countries today stand in sharp contrast 
to the situation in which child-labour laws were passed in Western Europe in the nineteenth 
century. In Europe, comprehensive child-labour restrictions were adopted precisely when 
children were moving from the family farm and workshop into formal employment in mills, 
mines, and factories, where they worked alongside adults. It was this direct competition 
between adult workers and children that motivated unions to oppose child labour. 
International interventions in developing countries today shift working children instead from 
formal employment back to the informal sector, undermining prospects for political reform. 
Thus, international policies aimed at reducing child labour may achieve the opposite of their 
intended effect. 
Reevaluating Policy Options for the International Community 
Our findings question the effectiveness of current international pressure tactics, such as 
consumer boycotts or imposing international labour standards, in reducing child labour in the 
long term. Since such policies also carry short-term costs for developing countries, the rationale 
for their use should be reconsidered. 
The international community still can, and should, help address the child-labour problem in 
developing countries. We are critical of interventions that work through restricting trade. Such 
policies have the potential to displace working children into informal employment, with 
negative repercussions for the prospects for future political reform. A more promising 
alternative would be policies that reward parents for choosing education over child labour for 
their children (a successful example of this sort is the PROGRESA program in Mexico). Such 
policies reduce economic dependence on child labour, without inducing detrimental 
displacement effects. Likewise, policies that create incentives for developing countries (e.g., 
through conditional aid) to restrict child labour anywhere in the economy (rather than just in 
the export sector) would be useful, although these may be difficult to enforce.  
In addition, our earlier work (Doepke and Zilibotti 2005) documents a link between fertility and 
attitudes towards child labour.iii
 
 In countries where child labour is unrestricted, parents tend to 
have many children in order to maximize child-labour income. High fertility, in turn, implies that 
families become economically dependent on child labour and unable to afford schooling for 
their children. Such families have little to gain from child labour restrictions, a fact that 
accounts for the low political support for reform and persistently high child-labour rates. From 
this perspective, policies discouraging high fertility or encouraging family planning may also 
increase the future support for local regulation of child labour. At the same time, social policies 
targeting poor families that already have many children may be necessary to mitigate the 
economic effects of child labour laws on these families.  
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i According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), in 2006 there were 218 million child labourers 
worldwide. 
ii See for example Edmonds (2008), who reports evidence for a case involving the Bangladeshi 
garment industry. Similarly, Basu and Zarghamee (2008) argues from a theoretical perspective 
that boycotts and trade sanctions may increase child labour. 
iii Indeed, there is a strong empirical correlation between fertility and the incidence of child labour across countries 
at a similar stage of development. 
